Surgery to align an infant child's genitals to a medically assigned sex is controversial because it is irreversible and therefore may potentially be detrimental to the child as they develop into a gender identity. I argue that the significant issue for genital-normalizing surgery is decision-making and that English law does not promote or protect the best interests of the intersex child or the inherent human rights that are protected by both domestic and international law. Using a doctrinal and socio-legal methodology along with a close analysis of bioethical arguments, I argue that the interpretation of the best interests of infant intersex children is manipulated to support the lack of social, legal and medical acceptance of intersex as an 'abnormality' that must be corrected, in order to conform to the accepted normality of binary male and female sex. In acknowledgment of this legal and professional standards deficit, I will propose a shared-decision-making approach to support the welfare of the child, which, at its core, places the child as the primary decision maker.
Introduction
There is intense controversy that surrounds the management of Disorders of Sex Development (DSD), commonly termed as intersex conditions. Much of the controversy focuses on surgery to align an infant's genitals to an assigned sex following medical investigation and legal sanctioning through parental consent, termed as genital-normalizing surgery.
1 Infant genital-normalizing surgery is of concern, in particular, because of the potential detrimental physical and psychological impact of irreversible surgery on the infant as they mature into childhood, adolescence and adulthood, and at the core of my profound concern is the decision-making process. The existing literature around decision-making and genital-normalizing surgery focuses on international jurisdictions, and this article seeks to apply the issues within the context of English law. I will argue that English law does not protect the intersex child or the inherent human rights of the child protected by both domestic and international law. In acknowledgment of this legal and professional standards deficit, I propose a shared-decisionmaking approach. This approach utilizes a safeguarding framework to protect the interests of the infant and considers the implications of surgery, placing a primacy on the child's views and thereby prohibiting genital-normalizing surgery in infancy.
Intersex is a general term used for a variety of conditions in which a person is born with a sexual or reproductive anatomy that does not fit the typical physical definitions of female or male.
2 Medical practice uses the term DSD to encompass congenital conditions in which the development of chromosomal, anatomical or gonadal sex is atypical. 3 It is estimated that the prevalence of babies born with ambiguous genitalia prompting medical investigation and a diagnosis is 1 in 2000 babies. 4 Genital-normalizing surgery is differentiated from other medical treatment as not being necessary, in that delaying or not carrying out surgery poses no immediate risk of physical harm to the child. I will not discuss surgery that is immediately or urgently required to correct genito-urinary abnormalities that pose immediate risk to a child's health. Where risk of physical harm is not immediately posed, genital-normalizing procedures remain radical and include clitoral reduction, vaginoplasty (formation of vagina) and removal of testicles.
5 Later in an intersex child's life, further surgery (such as removal of breast tissue and vaginoplasty to support sexual intercourse) is a possibility, following or during adolescence and development of secondary sexual characteristics.
The Intersex Society of North America (ISNA) published guidelines from a consortium of clinicians advocating that irreversible genital-normalizing surgery be cautiously approached and that gonadal surgery should not be carried out until the child can make a competent decision, unless there are credible malignancy concerns. 7 The plight of adult intersex individuals who were subjected to irreversible genital-normalizing surgery and the lasting physical and psychological harm that they are often left with forms the foundation of the intersex rights movement. 8 This harm may be physical, through pain or in relation to sexual function, but of even greater concern is that many intersex people do not identify with the sex they were assigned to, which has led to significant gender identity issues. 9 The legal issues raised in infant genital-normalizing surgery extend beyond parental decision-making, requiring a broader analysis to explore whether it amounts to legitimate medical treatment 10 and, importantly, asking the question of whether morally and legally it should be permitted in infancy.
Using a doctrinal and socio-legal methodology with analysis of bioethical argument, I will question the legality of genital-normalizing surgery for intersex infants. I will argue that infant genital-normalizing surgery subjects the intersex child to a brutal form of physical integrity interference. Of concern is not only that infant genital-normalizing surgery is lawful, but that it is also purveyed by medical practice as being in the infant's best interests, after a comprehensive diagnostic process and multidisciplinary approach, to support rearing the child as either male or female. 11 The rhetoric that genital normalizing is in the best interests of intersex infants is, I argue, manipulated to conform to the social legal and medical position that intersex is an abnormality that must be corrected, in order to conform to the accepted legal and medical definitions of binary male and female sex within society.
Sex, law and certainty
In order to understand the specific legal and ethical issues for genital-normalizing surgery in infancy, the relationship between intersex, law and medicine has to be considered. Central to this is differing sex and gender and analysing how sex has come to be medicalized to conform to the legal recognition of only binary male and female sexes. The concepts of sex and gender are often confused and used interchangeably within society, being regarded as the same characteristic. 12 Sex and gender are distinct, with sex being a biological term and gender being a psychological and cultural term. 13 Sex denotes biological characteristics that a person has with specific reference to genitalia and their reproductive system. 14 Gender traditionally denotes having either a male or female proscribed normative role in society. 15 These normative gender roles have led to tension in the recognition and acceptance of differences in sex and gender identity. 16 The predominant theory used to understand the relationship between sex and gender until the end of the 20th century was Professor John Money's nurture theory. 17 Money, a psychologist, advocated that children were gender neutral at birth and achieved their gender through how they were perceived socially. 18 Gender as a learned concept is now no longer regarded as being accurate, indeed as Thyen et al. argue biological sex, psychological factors, cultural, social and environmental influences all contribute to a child's gender identity. 19 Although accepting the social and cultural influences on gender identity, Hird differentiates intersex and argues that there is a significant biological sex influence on gender identity. 20 This is highlighted by the well reported experiences of intersex people who underwent surgical alignment, which they later condemned, despite the social and psychological nurturing of the aligned gender identity in childhood.
Money's nurture theory highlights the authority of medical science in assigning biological sex, subsequently influencing gender conformity, which still endures today within society. 21 Ripo suggests that medical sciences were complicit in the social control of conformity and this included sex and gender, through regulating decisions or acting as the decision maker, which was evident in intersex infants. 22 This conformity to sex being binary male or female from a feminist perspective exists to ensure that there is a division supporting traditional male and female identities and gender roles within society. 23 Furthermore, any acceptance of sex existing beyond this binary model weakens the patriarchal division in societies. 24 Hirst argues that it is the notion of sex being binary and biologically defined that prohibits acceptance of intersex. 25 The evolution of gender, however, has moved towards a spectrum of transgender and androgynous definitions that increasingly reject masculine and feminine norms, requiring society to remove the binary definitions of gender at least.
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Medicine and intersex
The advancement of medical science and sub-specialties within it, such as gynaecology, urology and endocrinology, began to move away from genitalia as a primary determination of sex characteristics from the mid part of the 20th century, instead looking at gonads and later chromosomal profile. 27 As further biological and technical advances in diagnosis developed within medical practice, surgical advances to physically 'correct' and 'align' an intersex infant's genitalia were carried out on the basis that they were of benefit. 28 The perceived benefit being that medicine could identify biological determinants of sex, align the infant to that sex through intervention and therefore shape masculine and feminine gender identity as the infant developed.
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The medical view is that intersex is something that can and should be corrected to avoid the psychological harm that is potentially perceived to occur as the infant develops. 30 This focuses on aligning the infant with anatomical and chromosomal characteristics to an assigned sex through thorough medical investigation. Medicine has evolved towards using an investigative approach beyond physical genital and gonad presentation to focus on hormonal and chromosomal diagnosis, with the emphasis still being on intersex as an abnormality. 31 Regardless of the approach, what is still apparent is the role of medicine in defining this abnormality and correcting it, in this case perpetuating binary framing of sex through surgical intervention.
Medicalization of intersex
Parental expectations are generally that a healthy baby is linked to a clear determination of sex at birth, being either male or female. 32 The onus is placed on the healthcare professional to confirm 'normality', or indeed confirm 'abnormality'. 33 Diamond and Sigmundson consider this approach as mutually satisfying for both parental desires for a clearly identifiable male or female sexed baby and the medical goal to correct any abnormality of sex if identified. 34 However, where the abnormality is focused on genitalia the question must be how is this established, in other words what is the universal standard of normal genitalia? Kennedy argues that the issue is conformity to accepted parameters, but that these are subjective to clinicians and fundamentally fail to consider the individual morphology of genitalia that render the ideal of 'normal' genitalia as entirely flawed. 35 Surgical intervention therefore provides medicine with the ability to satisfy social and parental desires for binary sex alignment and this includes an accepted ideal of 'normal' genital morphology.
It is important to recognize that there have been examples of parents not being told that their baby was intersex and correctional interventions, usually surgical, being carried out without parental consent. 36 This paternalistic approach, which is not represented in current professional standards, can at least in part be attributed to a medical assumption that genital and biological sex ambiguity is of such devastation that as Low and Hutson argue, only the death of a newborn is worse. 37 The clinical management of intersex infants has now evolved and promotes the support and education of parents on the intersex condition, to promote disclosure and reduce paternalistic attitudes within medicine and healthcare. 38 Despite this change in attitude, the medical approach is still to intervene after thorough assessment from a multidisciplinary team.
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The repercussions of decision-making for intersex infants will be discussed later on, but what is important at this point is the focus for medicine as being physical correction 32 to conform to a binary model of sex, rather than consideration of the wider problem of poor social acceptance of intersex. 40 The medicalization of intersex is further criticized by the intersex rights movement that has evolved, who argue that medicine takes a presumptive stance in favour of correcting intersex infants through physical intervention. 41 Intersex United Kingdom (UK) argues that intersex is not a medical problem but a social problem that requires acceptance and recognition that sex exists beyond male and female binary norms.
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Historically law was influenced through religion and heterosexual normative values. 43 English common law first addressed the issue of intersex 44 in the 16th century, when considering how to incorporate intersex children into society Lord Justice Coke held An Hermaphrodite (which is also called androgynous shall be heire, either as male or female, according to that kinde of the sex which doth prevaile . . . . And accordingly it ought to be baptized. 45 The dicta highlights that the law had a responsibility to ensure children were recognized as either male or female from birth, to conform to the accepted two sexes within religion. However, the legal position of male and female sex in law existed beyond simply that of a person's identity. In a historically paternalistic society and legal system, law required recognition of sex for the purpose of inheritance, legitimate conception of children and, of course, marriage. 46 This has resulted in intersex people facing legal uncertainty and being unrecognized in their natural state.
Sex and law
The law in England, Wales and Northern Ireland under the Births and Deaths Registration Act 1953 (s2) requires that all births be registered within 42 days and, although not explicit in the Act, part of the information required is that the child's sex is identified on the birth certificate as either male or female. Section 11(a) of the Equality Act 2010 defines sex as being 'a reference to a man or a woman', English law therefore defines sex as foremost which is biologically assigned at birth and that it is described as either being 40 47 This approach, although biological, is considered as being preferable to English law from the intersex rights movement perspective as it could allow the intersex child to decide whether they identify as male or female. 48 Delayed legal sex registration has been criticised, as Travis highlights, because the ultimate aim remains for the child to identify as either male or female. 49 Certainty of sex and legal recognition of this is considered by Samuels as being of greater significance than gender in society, highlighting the law's approach to biological sex in marriage, financial dependency, intestacy and parental rights. 50 The law in defining sex has been most established in marriage nullification cases. 51 The Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 provided that marriage could only be valid if it was between a man and a woman. 52 The statute relied on the sex declared on a person's birth certificate but gave no clear definition of who a man or woman was, as Chau and Herring explain, this was left to the courts.
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The courts considered the issue of defining sex for an intersex person in W v. W (Nullity: Gender). 54 The case focused on whether a marriage should be nullified where the female had undergone gender reassignment surgery but was born intersex. Charles J could not apply the biological test set out in Corbett v. Corbett (otherwise Ashley), 55 which although related only to identifying the sex of a transsexual person where chromosomes, gonads and genitalia were all congruent with a certain sex at birth was accepted by Ormrod J as being difficult for intersex application. The presentation of the intersex characteristics required the court to depart from the test, proposing that where the biological factors were not conclusive, six factors should be analysed: chromosomal, gonadal, psychological, hormonal, secondary sexual characteristics and genital features. 56 The recognition of the psychological factors by Charles J was a significant positive step according to Barlow, in departing from the 47. M. Van that the test in Corbett was always to be applied in the first instance. However, where it was not conclusive the modified approach set out by Charles J should be used until Parliament enacted legislation to the contrary. Lord Nicholls referred to those born intersex as 'victims of misfortune' and that although Charles J's test extended beyond biological factors, a male or female sex had to be identified for legal recognition. 62 This legal requirement to identify a person as either male or female suggests the 'misfortune' is that intersex individuals do not conform to this legal requirement, rather than any consideration that the law is inadequate in not recognizing intersex individuals as being neither male nor female, unless they identify as such.
The Gender Recognition Act 2004 provides that an individual can legally apply for a legal gender recognition certificate through provision of medical and psychological evidence. The focus for the Act is transsexualism, and it requires that a person suffers with or has suffered with gender dysphoria. 63 Sandland argues that the Act is again another missed opportunity to broaden the spectrum of sex identity, with the law demonstrating a conservative approach to binary gender construction. 64 This view is supported by Sharpe who in relation to intersex argues that the law has simply shifted its narrow definition of sex to that of gender, in setting out the difference between male and female. 57 Where does that leave intersex infants?
The conclusion from this brief analysis is that the law requires certainty, including a requirement for biological sex assignment at birth. Medicine considers intersex as an abnormality requiring diagnosis and intervention, with the aim of aligning an infant to a medically assigned sex. There is no legal recognition for intersex individuals being recognized outside of the binary biological sexes. The notion of legal and medical identification of a third sex, where a person may not be identified as either male or female is contentious. I will address the issue from a rights based perspective later on, but at this point, it is important to recognize that the notion of a third sex is not universally agreed. Many intersex rights groups argue that a generic sex classification obfuscates the many variations of intersex characteristics. 66 Importantly, a biological medical determination of sex may be incorrect because of the complexity of intersex characteristics and the development of the intersex person, which therefore cannot be achieved by medical practice with complete certainty. Despite the law providing a statutory mechanism for a change in an individual's gender recognition, this approach fails to differentiate sex and consider the biological difference between intersex and transsexualism identities.
It is difficult to unravel the relationship and influence that law has had on medicalizing intersex. The deference of law to medicine in defining medical 'treatment' is highlighted by genital-normalizing surgery through the evolution of surgical intervention without any legal challenge. The legal requirement for intersex children to be identified as either male or female leaves them vulnerable to surgical intervention that, I argue, has been historically unchallenged because the relationship between law and medicine is, as Miola argues, symbiotic.
67 Lord Nicholls' expression that intersex people are victims of 'misfortune' is indicative of the law accepting and encouraging genital-normalization surgery in order to maintain the binary sex status quo. As Kennedy argues 'there is complicity between the medical and the legal construction of variations of sex development as pathological disorders in urgent need of correction.'
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Decisions and consequences
When an infant's biological sex is ambiguous there follows a problematic dilemma for parents to make decisions in that infant's best interests. 69 Once an infant is diagnosed as intersex and has atypical genitalia, the question for parents and clinicians is whether to raise the baby as a boy or a girl and with this comes the decision around genital- normalizing surgery. 70 Blizzard summarizes the decisions in surgery as being, what surgery should be performed and when should it be performed? 71 Central to this is the legal authority that such decisions are based upon and, furthermore, whether parents even have the legal right to make genital-normalizing surgery decisions for infant intersex?
Children are recognized under the Family Law Reform Act 1969 as being under the age of 18, which is the age of majority. For those aged 16 and 17, section 8 of the Act allows the individual to consent independently for medical or surgical treatment. The capacity to make decisions is also presumed when a child attains the age of 16 under the Mental Capacity Act 2005.
72 Parents of children under the age of 16 have the ability to make decisions for their children, providing that they have parental responsibility under the Children Act 1989 (CA). Section 3 defines parental responsibility as All the rights, duties, powers, responsibilities and authority which by law a parent of a child has in relation to the child and his property.
The legal protection for parents making healthcare decisions in the best interests of their children was summarized by Lord Scarman in Gillick v. West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority
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It is abundantly plain that the law recognises that there is a right and a duty of parents to determine whether or not to seek medical advice in respect of their child, and, having received advice, to give or withhold consent to medical treatment. 74 However, under the CA, the courts have the authority to grant a specific issue order if parents are unable to or are not deemed to be acting in the best interests of a child. 75 While making decision which is against the interests of the child can be identified more easily where there is immediate physical risk posed to the child, it is more complex when parents' decisions consider their own interests and values. This is not just an issue for the courts but more so for clinical practice, where parental consent by nature will be influenced by the parental relationship. 
Law and relational decision-making
It is clear that consideration of the parents' welfare has a significant influence on genitalnormalizing surgery decision-making. For example, Gupta and Freeman argue that consideration of the best interests of the parents has as much to do with the decision to perform surgery on an intersex child as it has to do with the child. 76 Zeiler and Wickstrom suggest that consideration of parental welfare often focuses on parental frustration and anxiety, from which surgery offers a pragmatic solution to support certainty of sex. 77 Dayner et al. found that parents sought early surgery in part to promote adjustment to normal family life and even found instances of a desire to avoid social awkwardness. 78 In relation to genitalia, Zeiler and Wickstrom further consider the impact of ambiguous genitalia on parents, recognizing the perception that parenting a child with normal genitalia will have a positive impact upon the parental relationship with the child. 79 This is not to say that parents of intersex infants do not make decisions without considering the interests of the child. Greenberg highlights that the difficulties for parents making such decisions are that they do not have knowledge of intersex until faced with making a decision but at the same time, they do not want their child to feel 'abnormal'. 80 Normality appears to be a factor in the parental welfare approach, but what is of concern is the inherent anxiety that parents with an intersex child face and that this contributes to the decision to undergo surgery. Therefore, there is an essential need for clinicians to have ongoing communication with parents to support balancing the child's best interests against their own, which involves supporting not only decision-making for surgery but the social and personal challenges that parenting an intersex infant has. 81 Crissman et al. argue that effective dialogue between healthcare professionals and parents that removes the emphasis from surgery as a certain 'fix' is key to parents being informed before making decisions. 82 McDougall and Notini suggest that medical treatment be delayed when a decision taken by parents could cause harm, either physically or psychologically based on rationality and where reasonable alternatives are available. 83 To support children and their parents, but minimize the risks of surgery on intersex children based on uncertainty, the decision to adopt a sex for the child is considered to be less harmful and of course reversible. 84 This approach should only be considered providing children, and parents are educated and supported throughout the child's development, in recognition of possible change to gender identity and subsequent acceptance. 85 Of concern is that in the early support of parents, there is still the preference for early intervention based on both parental welfare and the apparent preference from medical professionals to promote surgery in relation to outcomes and parental welfare. 86 This medical preference for early surgery in turn has a significant impact upon the parent's decision. 87 Another consideration is that parents of intersex infants can fail to recognize the negative impact of decisions and other complications of genital-normalizing surgery on their child as they mature. 88 Lorenzo et al. found that parental decisional regret or remorse after infant genital surgery is often attributed to parents feeling pressured and encouraged to undertake early surgical intervention, without understanding or fully considering future implications for their child. 89 In recognition of parental interests, Bridgeman supports the relational decisionmaking approach, which recognizes that the relationship between parent(s) and a child directly influences that child's well-being, and therefore a child's best interests cannot be considered in isolation. 90 Part of Bridgeman's justification is the relationship between parents and children, described by Alderson, as not only being unique but holding insight of such quality that not even expert healthcare professionals could replicate. 91 The application of relational decision-making was considered by the courts as having merit in the decision of Re T (a Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment). 92 The Court of Appeal approved the decision taken by the parents of an 18-month-old boy to refuse a life-saving liver transplant despite medical opinion. Butler-Sloss LJ held that the mother and child were effectively one entity, with considerable weight being placed on the parent's welfare and the subsequent potential detrimental effect of this transferring to the care of the child.
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The decision in Re T has been heavily criticized. Michalowski, for example, argues that the courts have a paramount obligation to promote the best interests of the child and therefore should not allow parental values or beliefs to be considered as equal or indeed greater. 94 Re T, however, was not binding on the court in the latter case of Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation). 95 In Re A, the Court of Appeal considered whether surgical separation of conjoined twins should be carried out despite the parents' objections because it would result in the death of one of the children. Their Lordships were unanimous in that the surgery was in the best interests of the stronger twin Mary. Ward LJ highlighted the impossible position that the court was placed in, which led his Lordship to suggest that the court was no more equipped to make the decision than any other stranger to the situation. 96 Hewson agreed with Ward LJ, but criticized the decision, asserting that when a decision is as complex as in this case, parental beliefs should be equated with the child's best interests.
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Although relational decision-making may have importance in many of the decisions taken by parents during childhood, as Freeman argues there must be limitations as parental interests cannot outweigh a logical assessment of the child's best interests. 98 Freeman further argues that the beliefs and anxieties parents hold should not influence decisions that are so significant to the child as an individual. 99 In disagreement, Birchley argues that the best interests of the child can still be met, despite any harm that will occur, if parental well-being is considered a significant factor in the well-being of the child.
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The key issue here is agreed parental well-being, which may partly account for the lack of case law in intersex decision-making, but the courts have looked at non-therapeutic genital surgery in the form of ritual male circumcision. Disagreement between parents has required court intervention and these decisions offer insight into how the courts determine the best interests of a child, when there is no medical necessity to avoid physical harm.
The Law Commission advises that no criminal liability will be imposed on those who perform ritual non-therapeutic male circumcision, providing they are 93. Op appropriately qualified. 101 The British Medical Association (BMA) issued guidance on non-therapeutic male circumcision and states that although circumcision is considered as an invasive procedure with potential risks, there are significant potential psychological benefits to the child's upbringing and family life. 102 This position does echo the medical justification and traditional approach to intersex surgery, which is characterized in the context of male circumcision by Reis as being focused on the normalization of genitalia through corrective interventions to conform to societal or cultural norms. 103 Ritual male circumcision invites further parallels with surgery on the genitals of circumcised boys and intersex children and is justified on the basis of the perceived benefit for both the parents and the child as part of cultural identity and acceptance. 104 However, the inference from case law is that doctors are more likely to seek court approval and must do so when there is a parental disagreement, before performing non-therapeutic male circumcision.
The courts were initially faced with the issue of decision-making relating to ritual circumcision in Re J (Specific issue orders: child's religious upbringing and circumcision).
105 In this case, the boy's non-practicing Muslim father, who was separated from the child's Christian mother, requested that the boy be circumcised but his mother opposed the procedure. In consideration of section 1(3) of the CA, 106 Wall J ascertained that the best interests of the child would not be served by permitting circumcision because of the non-Muslim upbringing the child would have. Furthermore, Wall J held that the ability of a person with parental responsibility to consent to treatment for their child under the CA 107 did not apply to circumcision and that both parents must be in a. The ascertainable wishes and feelings of the child concerned (considered in the light of his age and understanding); b. His physical, emotional and educational needs; c. The likely effect on him of any change in his circumstances; d. His age, sex, background and any characteristics of his which the court considers relevant; e. Any harm which he has suffered or is at risk of suffering; f . How capable each of his parents, and any other person in relation to whom the court considers the question to be relevant, is of meeting his needs; g. The range of powers available to the court under this Act in the proceedings in question'.
107. Section 2(7) 'Where more than one person has parental responsibility for a child, each of them may act alone and without the other (or others) in meeting that responsibility; but agreement. 108 The decision was upheld on appeal and Butler-Sloss LJ highlighted that the invasive nature, permanence and risks of male circumcision required joint agreement or a court order. 109 Significantly, joint parental agreement appears to exclude consideration of the impact of the decision and it would therefore be problematic to the best interests of intersex children if the same approach was applied.
Recently in Re L and B (Children: Specific Issues: Temporary Leave to Remove from the Jurisdiction: Circumcision), 110 Roberts J held that two boys should not be circumcised based on their father's religiously influenced beliefs, on the test set out in the CA. Of significance was her Ladyship's reluctance to make an order on the basis of a relational influence without the children being part of the decision, I am simply deferring that decision to the point where each of the boys themselves will make their individual choices once they have the maturity and insight to appreciate the consequences and longer term effects of the decisions which they reach.
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Although based on religious identity, the decision considered the impact upon the father but significantly Roberts J sought certainty, which could not be provided There must be clear benefits which outweigh these risks which point towards circumcision at this point in time being in their best interests before I can sanction it as an appropriate course at this stage of their young lives.
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While the courts have considered that circumcision is not always in the child's best interests, the law recognizes that non-therapeutic male circumcision is acceptable within society, and parental influence is considered important enough to justify it in relation to the upbringing that the child will have. The criticism is whether parental influence, in this case a religious practice, resulting in a relational approach to decision-making is sufficient justification for irreversible surgery. Fox and Thompson have criticized the practice of ritual infant male circumcision, arguing that despite the courts recognizing the physical harm of circumcision to an infant, it is still justified on the basis of protecting the cultural interests of the parents. 113 The decision in Re L and B demonstrates, however, that consideration of parental interests is not consistently the position of the courts. The approach to non-therapeutic circumcision is inconsistent, and we are reminded again that parental agreement can make a medically unnecessary irreversible intervention lawful. nothing in this part shall be taken to affect the operation of any enactment which requires the consent of more than one person in a matter affecting the child'. 108. Re J (child's religious upbringing and circumcision) Svoboda also identifies similarities between genital-normalizing surgery and ritual male circumcision, particularly in relation to parental acceptance. 114 The problem with the argument of parental acceptance and upbringing is that it is entirely based on parental views and characteristics, failing to consider the child as an autonomous person in the future, 115 a point that I address later. Of course, it is recognized that parental views and characteristics contribute to the child's upbringing, but this should never prevail to the detriment of a child's physical integrity. Svoboda argues that the central issue in law for male circumcision decision-making should be bodily autonomy 116 and, furthermore, that this should be applied to intersex children to promote a unified approach to genital surgery without medical need.
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To put this in the context of parental influence, according to Ehrenreich and Barr, parental rights to make decisions in relation to genital surgery exist as a result of only particular cultural practices being condemned, such as female genital mutilation, thus promoting parental empowerment where it is not condemned.
118 Munby J held that in the case of non-therapeutic male circumcision Society and the law, including family law, are prepared to tolerate non-therapeutic male circumcision performed for religious or even for purely cultural or conventional reasons, concluding later with the point that 'reasonable' parenting is treated as permitting male circumcision.
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In the case of genital-normalizing surgery, parental empowerment stems from the accepted medical practice of surgery to 'correct' intersex children and thus avoid 'harm'. 120 What is evident is that the avoidance of harm includes parental harm as being significant or indeed a justification for performing genital-normalizing surgery. If the parental interests, whether personal or as part of conforming to a community's rigid views, are to be considered secondary to the best interests of the child and indeed separate, it is important to explore an individualized approach to the intersex child's best interests. 
Best interests and future autonomy
The CA provides that a broad assessment of best interests is carried out for children. Of particular relevance for intersex children is that the court should consider 'his age, sex, background and any characteristics of his which the court considers relevant' and as discussed earlier 'any harm which he has suffered or is at risk of suffering'. A key issue here is that determining the best interests for the intersex child cannot be established with enough certainty to avoid the risk of harm that surgical intervention may pose later in life.
Parental welfare does in part consider the child and the potential for distress within the family and child's upbringing that being intersex may cause, but there is little research to support this. 121 Whereas, more research to the contrary is published and identifies the detriment that is caused to both sex or gender identity and physical well-being following the complications of surgery. 122 Beyond physical harm is the psychological harm caused as a result of not only physical appearance and discomfort but also the fact that the assigned sex can be 'incorrect' in identifying with a sex and subsequent gender identity later in life. 123 This uncertainty and therefore potentially catastrophic error as a result of infant genital-normalizing surgery is, I argue, the fundamental flaw in the promotion of early surgery.
Lareau takes an emphatic prohibitory stance, in that where there is no immediate clinical need to prevent the child from harm, such decision-making power should not be legally provided for parents. 124 DeLaet argues that genital autonomy is sovereign and that no parent has the authority to consent to surgery, referring to any such intervention as 'mutilation'. 125 Central to this perspective are considerations of bodily integrity and autonomy of the intersex child, which are considered key ethical considerations in surgical management. 126 Autonomy is easier to contextualize for a more mature child, but difficult to consider for an infant child, being a concept that involves consideration of potential future intellectual, physical and emotional development. In recognition of the developing maturity of a child, the House of Lords in Gillick considered whether a child under the age of 16 could ever consent autonomously without parental agreement for healthcare treatment. Lord Scarman held that a child under the age of 16 could consent to treatment if they were able to understand the information, but that this on its own was not enough, and the child had to hold the maturity to understand what was involved based on an assessment of the child by a medical professional.
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Lord Fraser, although advocating that parental involvement should always be encouraged, held that in certain circumstances it might be that the doctor is better placed to judge the support and advice for treatment to promote the welfare of the child, rather than the child's parents. 128 Guidance from the General Medical Council requires that children are involved in all aspects of decision-making as far as possible, regardless of having the capacity to make the decision, and that future impact be considered. 129 The court in Re L and B demonstrated a good example of how the courts should consider future autonomy of the child and the participatory rights of children in relation to bodily integrity, allowing the children to make their own decisions when competent to do so and importantly separated from parental decision-making power.
The role of the courts in separating and removing parental decision-making authority for specialist medical treatments was established in the Australian case of Secretary of the Department of Health and Community Services v. JWB and SMB (Marion's case).
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The case looked at whether parental consent could make sterilization of a child with profound intellectual disabilities lawful. The court held that there were a small number of specialist treatments that required special consent involving the courts where the patient is a child. To identify these specialist treatments, the court recognized significant factors in Marion's Case, which were that the procedure was non-therapeutic, invasive and irreversible; that there was a significant risk of making the wrong decision and that the consequences of a wrong decision would be grave and serious. 131 Kennedy analyses the six intersex cases that have been heard by the Australian courts, which have focussed on gonadal surgery, but highlights that in Australia the majority of genital-normalizing surgeries do not require court approval. 132 The significant case that explains this is Re A (Surgical Treatment for Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia), 133 where the Australian courts had to consider who could make the decision for surgery. In Re A, the mother of a 14-year-old child, who was identified as a genetic female and had undergone genitalnormalizing surgery to support female identity as an infant, asked the court whether she could authorize surgical treatment for a series of invasive procedures. were to align the child with the male identity that he had assumed despite being considered female at birth, and included a hysterectomy, bilateral mastectomies and clitoral and labial surgery to create a penis. Mushin J considered firstly Gillick and found that although the child understood the issues he failed to demonstrate sufficient capacity to understand the consequences. 134 Then, the position of parental ability to consent was considered and this was decided to be outside of the scope of normal parental decisionmaking because of the consequences if the decision was wrong. 135 The decision was therefore for the court, which considered medical opinion, the child's opinion and that of other experts involved in the child's care, deciding that it was overwhelming in the child's best interests to have the surgery. 136 Although the court's decision in Re A did not consider the genital-normalizing surgery undergone in infancy (indeed as Kennedy highlights Mushin J appears dismissive of this as being of little significance), 137 there is an important decision-making issue highlighted. The court held that parents did not have the authority to make the decision for further surgery in adolescence because it fell outside the scope of normal parental decision-making. However, if this is the case in adolescence and the child's views are considered, how can it not be the same in infancy? I argue that had the court explored the issue of parental decision-making in infancy it may have come to this conclusion, and that by doing so, genital-normalizing surgery in infancy would be highlighted as problematic. The apparent reluctance to do so is argued by Kennedy as being based on the reliance upon and supremacy of medical evidence.
138 I suggest that since the consortium guidance on the management of intersex disorders was published, highlighting the need for a multi-professional assessment and involvement, the courts should have to recognize the psychosocial assessments made and that this should reduce the supremacy of medical evidence.
The irreversible nature of genital-normalizing surgery has to be recognized and differentiated from other medical treatment. Mils argues that children possess 'anticipatory autonomy rights' that are violated if that child's options are permanently restricted, 139 in this case, through surgical intervention. Medical opinion is now divided and does not necessarily reflect the traditional pro-intervention view developed by Money. 140 Genital-normalizing surgery is recommended by some surgeons to be deferred until either later in childhood, adolescence or even adulthood.
141 ISNA advocates that surgery be delayed until the child is able to consent to make the decision or 134. Op 142 Frader et al. support this position further from the perspective of healthcare professionals involved with intersex children, arguing that genitalnormalizing surgeries should where possible be left until the child can understand and make the decision. 143 Colombia provides that the ability of parents to consent to genital-normalizing surgery for their children is restricted, and where the child attains the age of five, they develop a level of autonomy that requires their permission over a significant period of support and education. 144 The Colombian courts have held that for parental consent to be valid, the decision must be made over a significant period of time, whereby the parents are counselled and educated on both the procedure and the condition to establish the best interests of the child.
In response to the harm of uncertainty in gender identity outcome following genitalnormalizing surgery, Karkazis et al. suggest a shared-decision-making approach should be adopted involving the child, parents and healthcare professionals. 145 This shared approach would require surgery to be delayed until the child could become involved in the decision-making process, which has been demonstrated as acceptable in Re L and B when considering the best interests of a child and genital surgery. Delaying surgery does have to be considered in relation to the child's mental health, in recognition that it can be adversely affected by coping with an intersex diagnosis. Cote advocates that the doctrine of therapeutic privilege, whereby no liability will occur for withholding the diagnosis from the child, should be used where the child's mental health is at risk, particularly in suicidal children. 146 Lloyd disagrees, arguing that therapeutic privilege should only be used in extreme circumstances. 147 Karkazis et al. suggest that using the shared-decision-making approach would support children from an early age, in not only the decision-making process but also psychologically in their development. 148 The law should recognize the potential detriment to the mental health of intersex children that genital-normalizing surgery may have, but rather than require the use of deceit, the shared-decision-making approach provides a preferable alternative.
Does intersex surgery fall outside of the medical exception?
In consideration of DeLaet's argument of genital autonomy, whereby any intervention that is not justified as a result of imminent physical harm be considered as mutilation, 149 it is worthwhile exploring whether genital-normalizing surgery could be considered as unlawful, using the comparator of Female Genital Mutilation (FGM). Central to this is whether it falls outside of the medical exception of legitimate medical treatment and therefore not incurring criminal liability in the context of physical harm, highlighted by the House of Lords in R v. Brown.
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FGM, known sometimes as female circumcision or cutting, is practiced in certain cultural communities across Africa and Asia. 151 Tilley describes FGM as intentional genital mutilation without medical need, including the partial and total removal of young female's genital organs based on the sexual, reproductive and psychological identity within that society. 152 Domestic law provides that the practice is unlawful and will incur criminal liability under the Female Genital Mutilation Act 2003. Furthermore, it is an offence to travel with a child overseas for the purposes of genital mutilation. The legal definition of the offence is found in section 1 of the Act A person is guilty of an offence if he excises, infibulates or otherwise mutilates the whole or any part of a girl's labia majora, labia minora or clitoris.
No offence is committed if the procedure is carried out by medical practitioners for legitimate medical reasons and it is necessary for the physical or mental health of the child.
This poses the question of whether genital-normalizing surgery is a legitimate medical treatment? Brazier and Fovargue explain that the starting point to establish medical legitimacy is whether it is accepted as 'proper' using the Bolam 153 test. This requires that it is a practice accepted as such by a body of medical opinion and that importantly in modern medicine is evidence based. 154 Brazier and Fovargue expand on legitimacy by explaining that the term 'medical' applies to an appropriate medical or healthcare practitioner who is qualified to perform such an intervention. 155 Fraser argues that genital-normalizing procedures involving clitoral resection should be considered unlawful and should be regarded as falling within the legal definition of FGM. 156 Fraser justifies this on the basis that there is no consensus that the procedures are of benefit or necessary, with significant harm caused at the time of surgery and potentially in the future. 157 The flaw in this approach is that although genitalnormalizing surgery is criticized, this criticism is not universal and the Bolam test does not require unanimous agreement, just that it withstands logical analysis (following the decision in Bolitho v. City and Hackney Health Authority).
158 The current approach to surgical intervention being supported by clinicians would make it difficult to demonstrate that genital-normalizing surgery falls outside of the medical exception until clinical management changes to support the mutilation argument.
Another criticism of the suggestion that genital-normalizing surgery should be considered unlawful is that the legal definition of genital mutilation focuses on female genitalia and does not protect male children. This is likely to present difficulties for the courts because as already explained non-therapeutic ritual circumcision is lawful and considered as acceptable by society. Therefore, for genital-normalizing surgery to be considered unlawful, a broader legal definition is required to cover both male and female genitals. This would be complex and, rather than focus on the procedure, would have to be specific to genital-normalizing surgery for intersex children or indeed expanded to all genital surgery where there is no immediate medical justification. Therefore at this time in society and medical practice, the illegality argument remains undecided and places genital-normalizing surgery within the medical exception, but does offer insight into the acceptance of genital-normalizing surgery in a broader context.
How English courts could decide?
If we accept that the illegality argument is at this point in time flawed and impractical, what then can the male circumcision cases and international intersex cases contribute to intersex decision-making within domestic law? The answer is that despite the discourse between parental welfare consideration and consideration of the best interests of the child, genital surgery causes at the very least immediate physical harm, exposure to unnecessary risks and is irreversible. Furthermore, I suggest that genital-normalizing surgery falls outside of the normal ability of parents to consent to treatment and support the adoption of a special consent consideration that draws influence from Marion's Case. Certainly, the shared-decision-making model would strengthen the justification for surgery in response to these points. I have argued earlier on that the current legal test for determining the best interests of a child would not be appropriate for intersex infants, and that it is already applied incorrectly to ritual male circumcision, in that it promotes the interests of the parents above the physical welfare of the child. In further support of this position for genital-normalizing surgery, is that the test in section 1(3) of the CA requires that the court consider 'the ascertainable wishes and feelings of the child concerned (considered in the light of his age and understanding)'. These wishes cannot be ascertained in infancy and because there is no immediate risk of physical harm, the courts should order that the surgery be delayed. Another issue in section 1(3) is consideration of 'his age, sex, background and any characteristics of his which the court considers relevant', which are far more complex in intersex infants. There is no certainty in biological determination of sex for intersex children without involving the child as an individual with self-awareness. The courts should have no choice other than to order that surgery be delayed, recognizing that the test for determining the best interests for intersex children cannot be applied in infancy.
The courts should recognize the controversy of genital-normalizing surgery and the potential catastrophic impact on the physical and mental welfare of the child. To protect the best interests of intersex children, the law has to move away from relational decision-making and consider the future autonomy of intersex infants. This can only be done through a shared-decision-making approach that involves the child, and essential to this is that the healthcare professionals involved support this shared approach. Finally, of concern is that while genital-normalizing surgery falls within the medical exception, the courts are unlikely to see a case come before them until doctors are faced with a parental disagreement, and this itself seems unlikely, given the negative perceptions that parenting an intersex child has for parents within society.
Safeguarding genital-normalizing surgery: A children's rights perspective
The unsatisfactory current decision-making position that I have outlined raises profound human rights concerns. The binding authority of universal human rights has notable merit in the context of the arguments against infant genital-normalizing surgery. Of concern is that these rights are not considered in this case, which warrants analysis and resolution. This resolution requires that the human rights of intersex infants and children be safeguarded, in recognition of the role of safeguarding law and policy in protecting children from the harmful acts of others.
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The authority for the rights of children is derived from two sources. Firstly, the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) is made enforceable against public authorities under the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA). Secondly, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) is ratified by the United Kingdom (UK), but only has persuasive force in the judgments of domestic courts.
The Swiss intersex rights group argues that there are numerous Articles of the UNCRC that are breached in infant genital-normalizing surgery, including Article 2 (freedom from discrimination), Article 3 (the best interests of the child being measures promoting advocacy to prevent harmful practices against intersex children in breach of the child's human rights.
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In 2016, the Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC) published the Concluding Observations of the fifth periodic report of the UK. 166 Importantly the CRC stated that the UK should Ensure that no one is subjected to unnecessary medical or surgical treatment during infancy and childhood, guarantee bodily integrity, autonomy and self-determination to children concerned, and provide families with intersex children with adequate counseling and support. 167 The report continued to provide guidance on the importance of educating healthcare professionals but also noted those who had undergone surgery should be redressed as 'victims'. 168 There is an obvious misalignment with how genital-normalizing surgery is considered within domestic law and how the CRC and the UN views genital-normalizing surgery. Mouriquand et al. argue, however, that the rights-based approach does not have the empirical evidence to support the claim that genital-normalizing surgery is absolutely harmful and that it is for science to consider the evidence as to whether this is the case in the long term. 169 Within UK medical practice, recently revised guidelines promote the use of a broad multi-disciplinary team to diagnose and support parents in assigning a sex to rear an intersex child, with consideration of genital surgery if indicated from the medical investigations. 170 Medical practice importantly does not imply that intersex children are victims, nor does it endorse genital-normalizing surgery being completely prohibited in infancy. There is no doubt that the medical approach is now more holistic, but I do not support the argument that the rights-based approach to genitalnormalizing surgery should be considered lesser than the quest for scientific evidence. Using empirical evidence on genital-normalizing surgery alone is concerning because current research is conflicting, and selective reliance upon empirical evidence alone allows medical practice to hold a greater position of power. Creighton et al. agree and recognize that rights are based on social moral ideals considered as just within a society, and that to ignore them encourages a paternalistic approach to medicine. 171 What then is the relationship between rights and medical practice for intersex children? Kilkelly explains that this is where the law must provide authority, balancing the rights of children and their best interests in relation to their health. 172 Integral to this within current law is the protection of these rights by the courts, and the key binding authority for human rights protection is the ECHR. 173 
Intersex children and the ECHR
As mentioned previously, the UNCRC although ratified by the UK is not directly enforceable in domestic law; however, the Joint Committee on Human Rights highlights that the UNCRC is interpreted through application of the Human Rights Act and within the ECtHR's interpretation of the ECHR. 174 Although the rights provided in the ECHR are defined as 'universal', children are 'essentially absent'. 175 Domestic courts and the ECtHR in Strasbourg have both had to interpret the ECHR and apply it to the rights of children as holders of those rights, rather than objects of protection. 176 In relation to genital-normalizing surgery in intersex children, the focus of the ECHR Articles is Article 3 (the prohibition of torture), Article 8 (respect for private and family life from the perspectives of both parents and children) and finally Article 14 (the prohibition of discrimination).
aim at correcting or alleviating a disability, may constitute torture and ill-treatment if enforced or administered without the free and informed consent of the person concerned. 178 In support of the Special Rapporteur, Tamar-Mattis argues that genital-normalizing surgery should be prohibited on the grounds that it constitutes state sanctioned torture that intentionally causes pain, suffering, loss of control and continuous degrading treatment throughout the entire process. 179 The prohibition of torture argument demonstrates the opposing views that a rights perspective holds in comparison to the medical justifications used for genital-normalizing surgery discussed earlier. What is important though in exploring the notion of genital-normalizing surgery being torturous is the extent to which this right is interpreted.
The ECtHR has established in the case of Tyrer v. United Kingdom 180 that those in a position of authority breach Article 3 by inflicting physical harm as punishment upon a child. In consideration of Article 19 of the UNCRC, the protection of children from violence, injury or abuse, the ECtHR held that Article 3 was breached in the corporal punishment case of A v. United Kingdom. 181 The ECtHR held in this case that states had a positive obligation within the domestic legal system to practically and effectively protect Article 3 rights. Later in Z and Others v. United Kingdom, 182 where four children were abused and neglected by their parents, the ECtHR held that again the authorities had failed to take effective and practical steps to protect the children under Article 3. These rights are, however, not breached where measures are proportionate to the therapeutic necessity of treatment following Herczegfalvy v. Austria.
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Therefore, the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture's findings above are contradicted by the law's deference to medicine, which legitimizes the 'therapeutic' framing of genital-normalizing surgery. In the absence of an ECtHR decision on genitalnormalizing surgery and disagreement with its therapeutic legitimacy, I do not support the application of Herczegfalvy here.
Practical steps extend beyond legislation (The CA 1989 and to ensure the safeguarding of children and impose a positive obligation on health and social care authorities to take responsibility for assessing, intervening and evaluating safeguarding measures for children. 184 The CA states that local authorities have an obligation to the welfare of a child 'in need' and identifies that a child whose health and welfare is likely to be significantly impaired is considered to be a child in need. 185 The National Health Service (NHS) has a statutory responsibility for safeguarding children, further influenced by professional codes of conduct and employee behavioural requirements, providing a framework to achieve this. 186 The NHS safeguarding policy sets out that inappropriate physical interventions are a form of physical harm. 187 Intersex children facing genitalnormalizing surgery are, however, not recognized by local authorities or the state as being 'in need' and I argue that these children are not being provided with the required protection against torture. If physical punishment or other abuse that does not cause permanent damage is considered tortuous and therefore subject to a positive obligation owed by the authorities, then how can irreversible surgery that potentially could cause catastrophic physical and mental damage to a person not be considered in the same way? The answer to this at the present time is that, as highlighted, the therapeutic legitimacy of genital-normalizing surgery has not been tested against Article 3, giving the illusion that rather than being harmful to a child's health, surgery is a positive intervention and therefore the child is not in need.
Privacy and family rights
Article 8 of the ECHR provides that 'Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence'. Within the UNCRC, these rights are found predominantly under the best interests of the child being paramount, the right to privacy and the right to respect of the views of the child. 188 Article 8 of the ECHR is, however, a qualified right and can be interfered with in accordance with domestic law for the purpose of protection of health. Importantly, Article 8 protects not only the rights of children but also the rights of parents to make decisions in respect of their child's upbringing, well-being and health. 189 In Nielson v. Denmark, 190 the ECtHR acknowledged the rights of parents to consent to medical treatment necessary for the health of their children under Article 8, and, therefore, their consent did not breach the child's rights under the same, even if the child disagreed. Although the case was concerned with a 12 year old being deprived of liberty under Article 5 of the ECHR, the court held that
The rights of parents to exercise parental authority over their children, having due regard to their corresponding parental responsibilities is recognised and protected by the (European Convention on Human Rights) in particular by Article 8.
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Lord Neuberger reiterated in P v. Cheshire West and Chester Council and another 192 that Nielson protected the right of a parent to make decisions based on medical advice. 193 However, in R (on the application of Axon) v. Secretary of State for Health, 194 it was held that a parent could not retain a right to parental authority for a medical decision where the young person concerned had understood the advice provided by the medical professional and its implications. Axon may support the mature child in deciding to undergo surgery but leaves the infant without such protection.
Fortin explains that there is often tension between the rights of the child and those of the parents, and in the case of infants, it is often difficult to recognize those rights in healthcare decisions where the consensus is a perceived benefit. 195 The UNCRC provides under Article 12 that respect be given to the views of the child and that the weighting of these views be increased with their maturity. Donnelly and Kilkelly agree with Fortin, recognizing the difficulty for infant's views to be considered in the case of irreversible interventions. 196 The ECtHR has stated though that where the parents' and children's rights under Article 8 are competing, the court will find in favour of the child if they assess that it is in the best interests of the child. In Elsholz v. Germany, 197 the ECtHR held that where a father's access to his child was damaging to the child, the rights of the child under Article 8 were of greater significance. This was further elaborated on in Yousef v. Netherlands, 198 where the ECtHR held that if both the rights of parents and the rights of the child were in consideration the rights of the child were paramount. Furthermore, that if a balance had to be struck then it should be in favour of the child. 199 The question is therefore whether the heavier weighting of the child's rights under Article 8 can be applied to genital-normalizing surgery in intersex infants when there is a medical perception of benefit influencing parental views, which does not sufficiently consider the potential serious harm that surgery may cause.
Harris and Keywood argue that individuals do not have the right to be ignorant to specific information and make a decision based on this ignorance. 200 Central to their claim is that an acceptance of the right not to know information has to be weighted against the impact of other individuals for whom the decision is relevant. 201 Although Harris and Keywood's argument is in the context of genetic information, I believe it has merit in the context of infant genital-normalizing surgery. Information is key to the informed nature of decision-making in healthcare and when information fails to consider the best interests of the child as a rights holder, Harris and Keywood argue that Article 8 is breached. 202 Jackson et al. found that when making difficult decisions, parents are influenced by emotions during the consultation process and, importantly, this can compromise their ability to make an informed decision. 203 Munro argues that accurate and comprehensive information is integral to both parents' and children's rights under Article 8. 204 However, Munro identifies that this can often cause tension within professional practice when faced with decisions affecting young children because of the potential for a selective approach from parents requiring and clinicians providing information. 205 To avoid the possibility of selective information, parents and clinicians have to be receptive and considerate to the future autonomy and rights-based arguments in order to establish the best interests of the child under Article 8. 206 This requires consideration of the ECHR when parents are provided with information to make healthcare decisions for their children. 207 In genital-normalizing surgery, I argue that this cannot be achieved in infancy and can only be achieved through a legally and professionally regulated decision-making framework that ensures accurate, and balanced information is provided to both parents and the older child.
Procedural justice in decision-making
The ECtHR has to balance consideration of views of both parents and children under Article 8 and, as such, support parents in making decisions regarding their children. 208 where there is no safeguarding within domestic law to protect it. In Herczegfalvy v. Austria 209 the court held that where medical necessity is concluded to justify enforced treatment, there must be a minimum level of legal safeguards to protect a person's rights under Article 8. In X v. Finland, 210 a case concerning the detention and forced medication of a mental health patient, the court held that
The absence of sufficient safeguards against forced medication by the treating doctors deprived the applicant of the minimum degree of protection to which she was entitled under the rule of law in a democratic society. 211 The court highlighted that treatment against a person's will breaches Article 8, using the authority of Glass v. United Kingdom.
212 In Glass, the ECtHR held that the enforced treatment of a child despite a refusal of consent by the mother had breached rights under Article 8. The court concluded that the treatment was not immediately necessary and that domestic law did not provide the minimum degree of protection for the best interests of the child. The key issue in the case was not that treatment went ahead without the mother's consent, but that she was not given an opportunity to be involved in the decision to protect the physical integrity of the child. This is perhaps problematic as parents and doctors generally agree on genitalnormalizing surgery, and there has not been a case where there is disagreement between doctors and parents; however, it is the legal minimum degree of protection that warrants consideration.
Safeguarding the physical integrity of a person, in recognition of the rights held under the ECHR, has required mandatory domestic legal consideration since the HRA was introduced, particularly in mental health and mental capacity law. 213 Of concern is the lack of procedural safeguarding for the physical integrity of children that extends to children's decision-making, which is often negated by the role of parents in making decisions. 214 As discussed earlier, domestic law has an inconsistent approach to protecting the physical integrity of a child under the welfare principle. Hagger argues that the rights of young children and children with learning disabilities requires the courts to adopt a more consistent and regulated approach to protecting the rights of children under Article 8. 215 Seatzu further acknowledges that the ECtHR has found it difficult to provide a consistent approach to finding whether the child's rights under Article 8 have been breached, when also having to consider the rights of parents. 216 One potential solution to determine when an intervention requires safeguarding from both domestic law and ECtHR is using a harm threshold for intervention against parental wishes. 217 The harm threshold considers the harm of intervening versus not intervening on the child. Birchley applies the harm threshold to interventions against parental wishes in the cases of refusal of treatment, however, acknowledges that it could also be applied to the courts refusing interventions despite parental wishes. 218 I suggest that safeguarding a person's physical integrity, as a requirement under Article 8 in X v. Finland, using the harm threshold approach supported by the authority of Glass, could be collectively applied to infant genital-normalizing surgery. This approach would recognize that genital-normalizing surgery is not immediately required and should therefore wait until the child can be involved in the decision-making to protect the child's physical integrity. I argue that surgery exceeds the harm threshold because of its permanence and the potential detriment to the child, beyond the initial pain and distress of surgery. Central to this argument is that Article 8 requires safeguarding measures to protect a person's physical integrity, which is not currently provided in the context of medical and parental decision-making in infant genital-normalizing surgery. Although Glass recognized a parent's ability to act in the best interests of their children, it established that intervention without discussion and a process that placed the best interests of the child as being paramount could breach Article 8 where treatment is not urgent. Therefore, it is imperative that both the law and professional standards consider the decision-making process in recognition of the case law under Article 8.
Freedom from discrimination
Article 14 provides that 'The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground', and in setting out protected characteristics, the Article states that sex is one such characteristic. This right is mirrored by the UNCRC. Travis argues that the anti-discrimination right under Article 14 is a more suitable basis to justify the protection of intersex children, particularly in relation to birth registration and genital-normalizing surgery in order to conform to a binary sex. 219 Carpenter expands on this and argues that intersex discrimination exists to ensure that intersex does not gain legal recognition because it fails to conform to medical and societal binary sex norms. 220 The recent German and Dutch legal reforms to birth registration have attempted to address this, suggesting an alternative approach that English law could adopt to avoid discrimination of intersex children through a compulsory requirement to have an identified sex. 221 The problem in arguing that the rights of intersex children have protection under English anti-discrimination law, is that intersex is not legally recognized? Consequently, the Equality Act 2010 provides that 'sex' is a protected characteristic but defines sex as being 'a reference to a man or to a woman'. 222 Safeguarding surgery -Expanding the shared-decision-making approach I have argued that in consideration of the UNCRC and in application of the ECHR, within domestic law, intersex children are at present having their rights breached when genital-normalizing surgery is carried out in infancy. Earlier, I supported a shareddecision-making approach that involves the child, the parents and the healthcare professionals. In light of the positive obligations of the state to uphold children's rights, I suggest that the NHS safeguarding framework be applied to genital-normalizing surgery Health professionals are in a strong position to identify welfare needs or safeguarding concerns regarding individual children and, where appropriate, provide support. This includes understanding risk factors, communicating effectively with children and families, liaising with other agencies, assessing needs and capacity, responding to those needs and contributing to multi-agency assessments and reviews. 223 I propose that in consideration of healthcare safeguarding, the law should enforce a specific process for infant genital-normalizing surgery decision-making that is congruent with the Australian example set out in Marion's Case. This must involve a multidisciplinary approach to assessment of the child's needs and, importantly, that is responsive to any pressure exerted on an intersex child to undergo genital-normalizing surgery.
In upholding the human rights afforded to children, English law should ensure that the intersex child facing genital-normalizing surgery is recognized as a child 'in need' under the CA. If surgery is to be considered as an acceptable intervention, then the proposed shared-decision-making approach must not only involve the child but should only take place when the child is able to participate in and understand the significance of the decision. If children and parents are not provided with sufficient information that is material to them, then it cannot be said that they are making an informed decision. Therefore, complete unbiased information, which should include information on not undergoing surgery, is required for the child and the parent to support the process of informed consent and comply with these rights. Physical integrity must also be represented in an amended approach to consideration of a child's best interests through the CA.
Safeguarding for genital-normalizing surgery is not something that simply warrants consideration. I argue that a shared-decision-making mechanism within the safeguarding framework is required to regulate the practice of surgery in infancy. Physical integrity is not just an ideal campaigned for by those who consider the human rights of intersex children to be breached. As a signatory to the UNCRC and in recognition of the legal enforcement of the ECHR, the decision-making process must be regulated by the law and enforced within professional standards to protect the human rights of intersex children.
Conclusion
The controversial surgical intervention of genital-normalizing surgery has been highlighted in this article as a breach of a child's physical integrity, where that child is not able to consent to irreversible intervention(s). The legal preference for certainty of (binary) biological sex is symbiotic to the view of medicine that intersex is an abnormality requiring correction. I have proposed a shared-decision-making approach that places the child at the forefront of the authority to make any decision to undergo genital-normalizing surgery. Not only should the law protect this approach, it should also be recognized as requiring a statutory safeguarding responsibility within healthcare provision.
Until an alternative decision-making approach is given legal authority, it is unlikely that the courts will be faced with a genital-normalizing surgery case, unless there is parental disagreement. My concern is that if the courts were presented with a genitalnormalizing surgery decision, the weight of medical evidence and the legal preference for certainty of biological sex would prevail in favour of surgery without a child's consent. Therefore, my final argument is that it is for Parliament to address the issues of binary sex recognition, the impact of binary sex recognition on health and whether existing legislation adequately protects the physical integrity of intersex children, which I have argued, it does not. The law must exist to protect everyone, but for intersex people this is simply not the case in a society that only recognizes and identifies binary sex, placing intersex children in an extremely vulnerable position. The most distressing aspect of intersex treatment is medically and legally legitimized irreversible genitalnormalizing surgery. However, it has to be recognized that genital surgery is not unique to intersex children, and the differing protection afforded, using non-therapeutic male circumcision and FGM as comparators, demonstrates inconsistencies, which merit an argument for all unnecessary infant genital surgery to be banned. This is perhaps the logical conclusion but I argue that genital-normalizing surgery is further distinguished because of the medical and legal position that considers this surgery as legitimate medical treatment. The aim of this surgery appears to promote societal and parental acceptance that conforms to binary sex normality, which is required by the law and apparently medicine. These norms must be challenged to highlight the surgical interference that may occur as a result of not conforming to a 'normal' biological male or female. While it may be the case that a child does consider surgery, and that it may be of benefit to that child, this decision cannot and should not be made in infancy.
Public policy should utilize safeguarding as an essential mechanism to protect the human right of intersex children. The catalyst for this protection is the law. Parliament and the courts must recognize that there is an implicit obligation to protect intersex children from genital-normalization surgery and that perhaps one mechanism by which to do so is to allow a child to be registered without assigning a sex. This is not to say that the solution is to identify a single additional legal third sex, as the complexities of this extend beyond this article. I have simply argued that allowing a child to be registered without an assigned sex would support the proposed decision-making framework. This would encourage the child to identify their sex and gender congruence and better enable any decisions on genital surgery to be lawfully considered.
